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THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
Admiralty and Maritime Law
ADMIRALTY - JURISDICTION - ADMIRALTY COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE DISTRIBUTION OF A LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
SETTLEMENT FUND IN ITS REGISTRY.
In re Central R.R. of N.J. (3d Cir. 1972)
The Santa Isabel, a vessel owned by Grace Line, Inc., rammed and
damaged a drawbridge owned by the New York and Long Branch Railroad
(Long Branch) in March 1966.1 Grace Line promptly filed a petition in
admiralty to limit its liability for damages arising out of the accident3"
In May 1966, Long Branch and its co-owners, the Central Railroad Co,
of New Jersey (Central) and the Pennsylvania Railroad (PRR), filed a
claim in the admiralty court against Grace Line for damages. Late in 1969,
that court permitted limitation of liability and accepted the settlement
figure that had been agreed on by the Grace Line and the three railroads.
5
The admiralty court ordered that amount placed in its registry while it
considered how the fund was to be allocated.
In March 1967, while its claim against Grace Line was still pending
in the admiralty court, Central filed a petition for reorganization. 4 The
reorganization court subsequently disagreed with the proposed division of
the settlement fund in the admiralty registry,5 and in October 1970 issued
an order which, in effect, directed how certain of the funds in that registry
1. The drawbridge was part of the 39.96 miles of track owned by Long Branch
R.R. Long Branch in turn was owned in equal shares by the Central Railroad Co.
of New Jersey (Central) and the Pennsylvania Railroad (PRR) which had joint
use of its tracks and facilities under a 999 year agreement entered into in 1930.
In re Central R.R. of N.J., 469 F.2d 857, 858 (3d Cir. 1972).
2. Grace Line filed the petition in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. Id. Limitation of liability is controlled by 46
U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (1970).
3. Grace Line's liability was limited to $1,500,000. According to the settlement's
proposed allocation, PRR was to receive $834,251.02, $740,482.95 of which represented
reimbursement for expenses, $84,889.94 consequential damages, and $8,878.13 interest;
Central was to receive $205,748.98 as reimbursement for consequential damages;
and Long Branch was to receive nothing. The proposed allocation also provided
$110,000.00 for counsel fees. 469 F.2d at 859.
4. This petition was filed in the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey pursuant to the Railroad Reorganization Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205 et seq.
(1970). 469 F.2d at 859.
5. Since, at the time of the accident, Central's cash position had prevented it
from advancing its 50 per cent share of the emergency expenses incurred by Long
Branch, PRR had advanced the full amount of $740,482.95. 469 F.2d at 858. Under the
terms of the settlement's proposed allocation this amount was to be repaid to PRR
in full. Id. at 859. The reorganization court found that PRR was entitled to only
one-half that amount - the $370,241.48 PRR had advanced on its own behalf-
As to the other $370,241.48, the reorganization court viewed PRR as an unsecured
creditor of Central who lacked a perfected security interest under New Jersey law.
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were to be allocated.1 Since the reorganization court's division of the
settlement proceeds would have resulted in the PRR receiving a sum over
$370,000 less than it was to have received under the terms of the proposed
admiralty allocation, 7 the PRR's successor, the Penn Central Transportation
Company s (Penn Central) appealed from the order. The Third Circuit
reversed the decision of the reorganization court, holding that the admiralty
court had exclusive jurisdiction over the distribution of the limitation of
liability settlement fund in its registry, and that the reorganization court
was without jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights of the claimants to that
fund. In re Central R.R. of N.J., 469 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1972).
The Constitution delegates admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the
federal government.9 Pursuant to that power, in 1851 Congress enacted
a statute to allow a shipowner to limit his liability for tort claims against
his vessels.' 0 The act was designed to encourage the development of
American shipping by allowing the shipowner to place a ceiling on the
amount of damages arising out of any one accident for which he could
be held liable." The statute confers jurisdiction on the federal district
courts generally'2 and the Supreme Court, exercising its rule-making
power, has assigned exclusive jurisdiction in limitation actions to the
admiralty courts.18
Bankruptcy and reorganization jurisdiction is also granted to the
federal government by the Constitution,'14 although federal bankruptcy law
did not substantially develop until 1898.15 Railroad reorganization in par-
6. Order No. 368, October 13, 1970. The trustee of Central was ordered, inter
alia, to withdraw $370,241.48, plus a sum representing PRR's share of the conse-
quential damages, from the admiralty court's registry and to pay it to the PRR.
The trustee was instructed to take "appropriate action" to obtain the balance for
the debtor. 469 F.2d at 860.
7. See note 5 supra.
8. The Penn Central was created by the February 1968 merger of the PRR
with the New York Central R.R. Penn Central petitioned for reorganization in
June 1970. 469 F.2d at 858 n.l.
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The constitutional grant is exclusively federal.
I E. BENEDICT, THE LAW OF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY § 1 (6th ed. 1940).
10. Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 43, § 3, 9 Stat. 635, as amended 46 U.S.C.
§ 183 (1970). The procedure for limitation of liability is presently regulated by
FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R.F., formerly General Admiralty Rules 51-54, 334 U.S. 864
(1948).
11. For a discussion of the history and development of shipowner limitation of
liability, see 3 E. BENEDICT, supra note 9, §§ 474-78, 541-44; Eyer, Shipowner's
Limitation of Liability - New Directions for an Old Doctrine, 16 STAN. L. REV. 370
(1964). The right to limit liability has been extended to shipowners whose vessels
have been involved in accidents with structures attached to land. Richardson v.
Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911). Such accidents historically did not fall within
admiralty jurisdiction. See I E. BENEDICT, supra note 9, § 101 (Supp. 1972).
12. See 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
13. The Court first issued its rules governing the practice in limitation proceedings
in 1872. Supplemental Rules of Practice in Admiralty 54-57, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
xii-xiv.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
15. 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 0.01, at 1 (14th ed. 1971).
[VOL. 19
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss2/4
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
ticular is governed by the Railroad Reorganization Act,16 which provides
that during the reorganization proceedings" the reorganization court has
"exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor and its property wherever located.''8
This extensive grant of jurisdiction was designed to correct some of the
inefficiencies encountered under the earlier system of equity receiverships
in which courts often found themselves handicapped by a lack of juris-
dictional power and could not effectively administer and control all aspects
of the debtor's estate. 19 The jurisdictional grant is not all-inclusive, how-
ever, since questions of whether or not certain "property" actually belongs
to the debtor may have to be settled by other courts.20
In the instant case, the majority did not hesitate in limiting the re-
organization court's power over the debtor's "property." The court defined
the issue as being whether or not the admiralty court's jurisdiction was
exclusive as to the disposition among claimants21 of a fund in its possession
due to settlement of a limitation of liability proceeding, 22 and answered the
question in the affirmative. 2 The court stressed the fact that the admiralty
court had specifically directed that this fund was subject to its continuing
control, 24 and that in spite of that decision the reorganization court had
attempted to determine the legal rights of Central and PRR in the sum
2 5
The court rejected this attempted usurpation of the admiralty court's power,
asserting that it had been "long settled" that, once jurisdiction was acquired
by an admiralty court in a limitation of liability proceeding in which the
claims 26 exceeded the value of the vessel plus freight, the jurisdiction
16. 11 U.S.C. § 205 et seq. (1970). For a general analysis and history of the
legislative development of this statute, see 5 W. COLLIER, supra note 15, 77.02,
at 466.4-73.
17. Reorganization procedure is designed to make the debtor sound while fairly
adjusting the legal rights of the debtor's creditors and shareholders. 6 W. COLLIER,
supro note 15, ff 0.01, at 2.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1970).
19. 6 W. COLLIER, supra note 15, 3.07, at 460-63. For a description of how
the reorganization plan is implemented, see 2 id. 77.02, at 472-73.
20. It should be noted, when considering the decision in the instant case, that
the Third Circuit has adopted an expansive definition as to what could be considered
the "property" of the debtor for jurisdictional purposes, and has affirmed the power
of a reorganization court to enjoin any action that would impair the property or
assets of the debtor, even though that "property" lay outside of the court's territorial
jurisdiction and the question of ownership was very much in dispute. See In re
International Power Sec. Corp., 170 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1948).
21. The court was inconsistent in its characterization of the railroads' claim.
See note 38 infra.
22. 469 F.2d at 861.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 863. The majority noted that the reorganization court had not discussed
the question of its own jurisdiction and seemed particularly troubled by the summary
nature of the action taken by that court. Id.
25. Id. at 860-61. The court emphasized the fact that the reorganization court
had "adjudicated" the rights of the various claimants to a fund in an admiralty
registry. Id. at 860.
26. See notes 40-43 and accompanying text infra.
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was exclusive.2 T Thus, for the majority, the solution was clear; the ad-
miralty court had the fund in its registry and its jurisdiction was exclusive,
therefore the reorganization court completely lacked the power to issue,
any orders affecting the fund.
Judge Adams, dissenting in part and concurring in part,2 8 did not think
that the issues raised in the case could be disposed of so simply.2 9 Unlike
the majority, he recognized and discussed the jurisdictional basis for the
reorganization court's order, 0 and could not agree that the reorganization
court lacked jurisdiction.3 1 Since Judge Adams did not consider that prece-
dent required the court to vacate the order of the reorganization court on.
jurisdictional grounds, 8 2 he was free to adopt a functional approach to the-
issues, as opposed to the more formalistic one adopted by the majority.
After examining the purposes and functions of the limitation of liability
and the reorganization statutes,3 3 he concluded that the congressional pur-
pose behind the grant of extensive jurisdiction to the admiralty courts.
would not be aided by the decision reached by the court,3 4 and that the
majority's decision would defeat the purpose behind the broad congressional
delegation of power to the reorganization courts.3 5 Judge Adams there-
fore considered that the jurisdictional conflict should have been resolved in.
favor of the reorganization court.
36
It is notable that the majority chose to base its decision on a broad.
reading of the admiralty court's powers in a limitation of liability proceed-
ing, for it is submitted that the court had the alternative of approaching
the situation in the same functional manner as Judge Adams did. The
27. 469 F.2d at 861. The majority relied on a series of Supreme Court cases
involving multiple claimants. Id. at 861-62. Judge Adams pointed out, however,
that here there was "essentially" a single claimant and that the policy of avoiding a
multiplicity of suits was therefore not relevant. Id. at 869 (dissenting opinion).
28. The majority, after deciding that the reorganization court lacked juris-
diction, went on to conclude that that court was incorrect in its assumption that
Central had agreed to any "overriding obligation" to repay PRR. Id. at 863. Judge
Adams agreed with the latter conclusion but dissented on the jurisdictional aspects
of the court's decision. Id. at 871 (dissenting opinion).
29. Id. at 871 n.12 (dissenting opinion). In Judge Adams' view the court's task
was to reconcile the two statutes, not to resort to a "mechanical rule" to resolve the
conflict. Id. at 867 (dissenting opinion).
30. Id. at 869-71 (dissenting opinion).
31. Id. at 865, 867, 871 (dissenting opinion).
32. Id. at 869 (dissenting opinion).
33. Id. at 867-69 (dissenting opinion).
34. Id. at 869, 871 (dissenting opinion).
35. Id. at 871 (dissenting opinion).
36. Judge Adams pointed out the reorganization court's decision did not effect
the "primary functions" of the admiralty court - limiting liability and deciding
negligence. Id. at 871 n.11 (dissenting opinion). His "functional" approach is illus-
trated by his concession that, under "usual circumstances," the admiralty court should
decide the allocation. Id. at 869 (dissenting opinion). What presumably made this
instance "unusual" was the availability of the reorganization court's expertise, an
expertise that ironically failed it here; both the majority and the dissent disapproved
of the reorganization court's allocation.
[VOL. 19'
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-cases cited by the majority 7 to justify its conclusion that the admiralty
,court's jurisdiction was exclusive are all arguably distinguishable from the
instant case in that they all involved multiple claimants. While neither the
majority nor Judge Adams was particularly clear on this point,"" it would
seem entirely possible to characterize the petition of Central, PRR, and
*Long Branch as being a "single claim," 39 and thus bring this case, at least
by analogy, under a well recognized "single claimant" exception to the
'exclusive jurisdiction rule in limitation of liability cases.
The "single claimant" exception is based on a desire to accommodate
the shipowner's right to petition in admiralty to limit his liability with
-the plaintiff's right to pursue his remedies in a common law court. 40 The
-exception, recognized by the Supreme Court in two decisions in the early
1930's,41 allows the single claimant to litigate the issue of shipowner
liability in a non-admiralty forum so long as the admiralty court retains
,exclusive jurisdiction over the limitation question. 42 If a transfer of the
37. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954); Just v. Chambers,
312 U.S. 383 (1941); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co.,
.273 U.S. 207 (1927); Providence & N.Y. S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578
(1883).
38. The majority initially noted that the three railroads filed "a claim." 469
F.2d at 859. However, "claim" was usually used by the majority in its plural form
'and the admiralty cases cited all involved multiple claims. See notes 39-43 and
.accompanying text infra. The majority apparently did not see any significance in the
'possible distinction between singular and plural plaintiffs.
Judge Adams was clearly willing to view this as a single claim. See 469
F.2d at 867, 869 (dissenting opinion). It is submitted that the court could have
used this distinction as a basis for the proposition that the jurisdiction of the
admiralty court was not exclusive. See note 43 infra.
Curiously, the court, in dicta, observed that Long Branch was the claimant
that alone could be compensated. 469 F.2d at 865. Presumably this supports the
position that the reorganization court should not have adjudicated the allocation of
funds due Long Branch. However, the opposite conclusion might also be reached,
i.e., that the admiralty court's interest ceased once it was established that Long
Branch was entitled to the fund, and that the division of the fund among the
'co-owners of Long Branch might well be left to the reorganization court.
39. For examples of "single claims," see In re Republic of (S.) Korea, 175
F. Supp. 732, 735 (D. Ore. 1959) (seaman's suit carried with it a potential claim
for indemnification on the part of the ship's agent) ; In re M. P. Howlett, Inc.,
75 F. Supp. 438, 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1948) (plaintiff's insurer also had a claim for
money it had advanced).
40. The policies that underlie the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the admiralty
-court in the multiple claimant-limited fund situation - avoiding multiple suits and
conflicting verdicts - do not apply where there is a single claim. See G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 10-19 (1957).
41. Ex porte Green, 286 U.S. 437 (1932) ; Langes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931).
42. Ex parte Green, 286 U.S. 437, 439-40; Langes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, ;41-42.
A plaintiff has a traditional right to a common law remedy under the "saving
to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76, as amended,
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970). Under the "single claimant" exception limitation is
decided in the admiralty court and liability in the state court; the "rights of both
parties" are preserved. 282 U.S. at 541. For a further discussion sre H. BAER,
ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT § 10-4 (2d ed. 1969); 3 E. BENEDICT,
supra note 9, § 491.
Since the Green case, the "single claimant" rule of comity with a non-
admiralty forum has been followed by several circuits. See Famiano v. Enyeart,
398 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1968): George J. Waldie Towing Co. v. Ricca, 227 F.2d 900
(2d Cir. 1955) ; The Helen R., 109 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1940). The view expressed
by Judge Adams in the instant case would seem to be more consistent with the
Green approach to conflicts with the admiralty jurisdiction than the view held by
the majority.
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authority to decide liability is permissible, it would then seem that the
court's holding as to the exclusivity of the admiralty jurisdiction in the
instant case was not as obvious a conclusion as the majority deemed it to
be.43 If this is so, then it would have been possible for the majority to
do that which it did not do - recognize and directly address the problem
of achieving some reconciliation of the conflict between the admiralty and
reorganization jurisdictions.
While conceding the appropriateness of the admiralty court's juris-
diction in regard to the issues of liability and limitation, 44 Judge Adams
found little merit in retaining control of the allocation in that forum,
4
0
since, as he contended, the admiralty court did not even address the merits
of the settlement which it approved. 40  However, while Judge Adams'
arguments for a "symbiosis" of the two statutes may be persuasive in terms
of economy in the allocation of judicial resources, any implementation
of the reorganization court's order would require an extension of the juris-
dictional power of the reorganization court. 47 While the Third Circuit has
been expansive in its approach toward reorganization jurisdiction in the
past,48 a limit traditionally has been placed on the reorganization court's
power where the property in question is not in the debtor's possession and
is subject to a bona fide adverse claim. 49 In such a case the procedure is
usually a plenary action wherein the trustee of the debtor sues to gain
possession of the property.50 The reorganization court's attempt to assert
control over the fund in the admiralty court's registry without resort to
plenary process would thus appear to be improper.
Although the reorganization court's attempt to control the disposition
of the fund may justifiably be criticized, it is not at all clear why, especially
in light of Judge Adams' argument based on the disparate functions and
capabilities of the two courts, the reorganization court should be com-
pletely deprived of any opportunity to attempt such an allocation. While
43. It is submitted that the court could have characterized the case as one
involving a single claim. The delegation of authority in the single claimant cases
could then have served as precedent for the proposition that the admiralty court's
jurisdiction need not be exclusive in the instant situation, and the majority could
have approached the merits of the argument for allowing the reorganization court
to settle the allocation question. The "comity" analysis adopted in Green would also
seem germane.
44. 469 F.2d at 866 (dissenting opinion).
45. Id. at 871 (dissenting opinion). See note 36 supra.
46. 469 F.2d at 866 (dissenting opinion).
47. See 6 W. COLLIER, supra note 18, If 3.05, at 448; id. % 3.07, at 466. Where
property is held by a bona fide claimant outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the
reorganization court, resort to summary process is normally not permitted. Id.
ff 3.07, at 466.
48. See cases cited in 469 F.2d at 869-70 (dissenting opinion). While none
of these cases involved as formidable a challenge to the reorganization power as
was posed here by the presence of the "property" in the admiralty registry, they
would support a broad interpretation of the extent of the reorganization court's
jurisdiction. One might presume from the majority's silence on this subject that
the court did not find Judge Adams' argument persuasive. See also note 20 and
acompanying text supra.
49. 6 W. COLLIER, supra note 18, 3.05, at 448. See also id. ff 3.07, at 466.
50. A plenary action has been defined as the "regular, ordinary civil action."
2 W. COLLIER, supra note 18, 1" 23.02, at 411. See 44 CORNELL L.Q. 107 (1958).
[VOL. 19
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a close reading of the majority's opinion might not require such a conclu-
sion,51 it is not at all clear that that was not, in fact, what the court meant.
5 2
Unfortunately, there is no discussion of this possibility in the opinion.
The court, instead of analyzing the limitations that exist on the expan-
sion of reorganization jurisdiction, chose to emphasize the traditional con-
trol admiralty courts retain over limitation of liability actions. While
strongly affirming the power inherent in the limitation of liability proceed-
ing, the court turned away from a rare opportunity for a thoughtful
analysis of the relative parameters of the reorganization and admiralty
jurisdictions.
A.A.G.
ADMIRALTY - WARRANTY OF SEAWORTHINESS - WARRANTY TO A
SEAMAN DOES NOT INCLUDE OBLIGATION TO FURNISH A REASON-
ABLY SAFE PLACE TO WORK.
Earles v. Union Barge Line Corp. (3d Cir. 1973)
Employees of an independent contractor brought suit against a barge
owner for a breach of the warranty of seaworthiness for injuries sustained
from breathing poisonous fumes in the course of cleaning the barge.' The
vessel had been discharged of poisonous chemical cargo prior to its delivery
to plaintiffs' employer who had contracted with the barge owner to strip,
wash, and pump the barge clean. 2 Plaintiffs entered one of the barge's
tanks to clean it, without knowledge of the poisonous cargo or fumes,
and were quickly overcome.3 A jury trial in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on the issue of unsea-
worthiness resulted in verdicts for the employees.4 On appeal, the Third
Circuit reversed, holding that it was error for the trial court to charge
51. The majority seemed as disturbed by the manner in which the reorganization
court asserted its power as by the assertion of power itself. See notes 24 & 25 and
accompanying text supra. A narrow reading of the opinion might support the
conclusion that if the reorganization court had gained control of the fund by less
pre-emptive means - if it had requested the fund rather than demanded it, and the
admiralty court had agreed - the reorganization court might have been allowed to
allocate the fund on the basis of its obvious interest and expertise.
52. A broad reading of the majority opinion would justify a conclusion that,
once the settlement fund came within the control of the admiralty forum, all
questions as to allocation had to be settled by it. This could be supported by
stressing the word "shall" in FED. R. Civ. P. SupP. R. F. (8), cited by the majority
as authority for the proposition that there was no need for the reorganization court
to consider the objections other creditors had to the admiralty settlement allocation,
since the alternative of a hearing in the admiralty forum was always available.
469 F.2d at 862-63.
1. Earles v. Union Barge Line Corp., 321 F. Supp. 1329 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
2. Earles v. Union Barge Line Corp., 486 F.2d 1097, 1099 (3d Cir. 1973).
3. Id. at 1099-1100.
4. Id. at 1098.
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that the warranty of seaworthiness includes the duty to provide a reason-
ably safe place for a seaman to work. Earles v. Union Barge Line Corp.,
486 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1973).
There has been no clear and consistent line of demarcation between
liability for negligence and liability for unseaworthiness in admiralty law.8
Historically a seaman could not recover from a shipowner for injuries
resulting from negligence. 6 However, in 1903, the Supreme Court moved
away from that general proposition in The Osceola,7 wherein the Court,
while denying recovery for negligence, held a shipowner liable for the
personal injuries of a seaman when negligence rendered the vessel unsea-
worthy." Thus, after The Osceola, liability for unseaworthiness was predi-
cated upon the shipowner's lack of reasonable care.9 In Mahnich v.
Southern Steamship Co.10 the Court shifted its position and, looking to
dictum in Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger," characterized the ship-
owner's duty as an absolute warranty - a liability which would not be
relieved by the exercise of due care, and, therefore, not predicated on negli-
gence.1 2 Breach of the warranty of seaworthiness owed by shipowner to
seaman,' s which was a proximate cause of injuries, gave rise to strict
liability.
In Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.,14 the Supreme Court, considering
the question of whether, with respect to "transitory" unseaworthiness,
liability was limited by concepts of negligence, emphasized the independence
of the two concepts, 15 and focused on the scope of the warranty of sea-
worthiness. The warranty consists of an absolute duty "to furnish a vessel
and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use."' 6 For liability
5. For a discussion of the origin and history of mariners' remedies for injuries
in general and injuries resulting from unseaworthiness of the vessel, see Tetreault,
Seamen, Seaworthiness and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 381
(1954). For a review of the doctrine of unseaworthiness in personal injury cases as
developed by the Supreme Court, see Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539
(1960) ; Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
6. Tetreault, supra note 5, at 385, 392.
7. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
8. Id. at 175.
9. Tetreault, supra note 5, at 392.
10. 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
11. 259 U.S. 255 (1922). In Carlisle Packing. the shipowner was found negli-
gent, but the view was expressed that there could be liability for unseaworthiness
without regard to negligence.
12. 321 U.S. at 100.
13. The Court applied the warranty to employees of independent contractors
in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). Subsequently, the Court re-
fused to limit the Sieracki holding to longshoremen and allowed a carpenter doing
repairs to recover against the shipowner. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406
(1953). Congress, however, has eliminated the warranty of seaworthiness with respect
to those employees covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. II, 1972). For a discussion of the elimination
of the warranty and longshoremen's remedies for personal iniuries in general, see
Note, Maritime Jurisdiction and Longshoremen's Remedies, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 649.
14. 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
15. While the two concepts are separate, and while unseaworthiness is not de-
pendent upon negligence, negligence can result in unseaworthiness. See Usner v.
Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 500 (1971).
16. 362 U.S. at 500.
[VOL. 19
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to attach there must be a condition 17 which causes injury to a seaman.
It is not necessary that the vessel owner be aware of the condition ;ls the
condition may be outside the owner's control ;19 and, it may be temporary
as well as permanent.2 0 The Supreme Court appeared to be consistently
expanding liability for unseaworthiness until its decision in Usner v.
Luckenbach Overseas Corp.21 wherein it distinguished a single negligent
act of a third party from an unseaworthy condition and concluded that
operational negligence does not necessarily constitute instant unseaworthi-
ness.
22
In the instant case, the barge owner contended as a matter of law
that the barge was not unseaworthy. 23 The court, looking to prior cases
in the Second2 and Fifth Circuits, 25 as well as its own,26 which had held
noxious fumes in a ship's hold to have created an unseaworthy condition,
flatly rejected that argument. 27  The court concluded that had the jury
been correctly charged on the law of unseaworthiness it would have had
no reason to disturb the verdict for the plaintiffs. 28 However, the trial court
had charged:
A ship owner's warranty of seaworthiness includes furnishing a reason-
ably safe place for a seaman or one working aboard the barge to
perform his chores.
2 9
The court of appeals found the charge to be reversible error.a0 The lower
court, it concluded, had mistakenly confused and combined concepts which
17. As noted by the Earles court, "where there is no defective condition of the
equipment, appurtenances, crew, cargo, or gear of the ship, then no liability for un-
seaworthiness can exist." 486 F.2d at 1102-03. For a discussion of the expansion of the
definition of a "condition," see 17 VILL. L. REv. 130, 132-34 (1971).
18. 362 U.S. at 549.
19. Id.
20. In Mitchell, for example, the defective condition was slime on a railing.
Id. at 540.
21. 400 U.S. 494 (1971).
22. Id. at 500. Usner held that one unforeseeable act of negligence by a fellow
longshoreman does not result in liability for unseaworthiness. Id.
23. 486 F.2d at 1103.
24. Albanese v. N.V. Nederl. Amerik Stoomv. Maats, 346 F.2d 481 (2d Cir.),
rev'd on other grounds, 382 U.S. 283 (1965).
25. Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Serv. of Tex., Inc., 412 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1969),
petition for cert. dismissed, 396 U.S. 1033 (1970).
26. Jones v. Den Norske Amerikalinje A/S, 451 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1971). In
Jones, the court followed the Albanese theory of unseaworthiness and approved re-
covery on that basis by a longshoreman who had sustained injuries from breathing
carbon monoxide in the ship's hold.
27. 486 F.2d at 1103. The court noted that had the employer known that it was
being hired to remove poisonous fumes and had the plaintiffs been told, then recovery
could not be had on the basis of unseaworthiness. Id. at 1104. "[T here is no warranty
that the vessel is seaworthy with respect to the unseaworthy condition which is
directly responsible for bringing aboard the persons claiming the benefit of the war-
ranty." Id., quoting Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Serv. of Tex., Inc., 412 F.2d 1011,
1030 (5th Cir. 1969). However, no evidence had been introduced at trial concerning
knowledge of the fumes on the part of either the employer or barge owner. 486
F.2d at 1104.
28. 486 F.2d at 1104.
29. Id. (emphasis supplied by the court of appeals).
30. Id. at 1107.
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belonged to the law of negligence with the strict liability of the warranty
of seaworthiness.
The duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work was characterized
by the court of appeals as a duty of care, the breach of which, if the proxi-
mate cause of injury, gives rise to liability for negligence. 31 The Supreme
Court had 'clearly and repeatedly" stated that the shipowner's duty to
provide a seaworthy vessel was not dependent upon concepts of negligence
- liability under the two concepts was wholly distinct.8 2 Therefore, the
court reasoned, even though the same occurrence could conceivably breach
both duties, a breach of one did not necessarily result in a breach of the
other. As the court noted, whether the barge was unseaworthy depended
entirely upon whether it was reasonably fit for the purpose for which it
was to be used and not upon the barge owner's negligence. 33 To charge,
in effect, that liability for unseaworthiness would result in all cases from
the shipowner's negligence was error.
34
The opinion in Earles appears clear and well reasoned. While one
might argue that the duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work does
not appear so different from the duty to provide equipment reasonably
suited for its intended use that the two should be separated, 5 they are two
31. The court stated that the duty was "clearly a duty of care." Id. at 1104
(emphasis added). Given the distinction the Supreme Court has drawn between the
concepts of unseaworthiness and negligence, such a characterization would appear to
"put the rabbit in the hat." If the duty is clearly a duty of care, breach of which
may give rise to liability for negligence, and if unseaworthiness is distinct from
negligence, then, although action which would breach a duty of care might also,
under certain circumstances, breach the warranty of seaworthiness, a charge which,
in effect, states that mere breach of a duty of care must be a breach of the warranty
is clearly erroneous. The court, however, did not rest on its bare characterization
of the duty to support its position, It looked to the language in three Supreme Court
cases which indicated that the duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work belonged
to the law of negligence. Id. at 1104-05.
32. The court cited and quoted both Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400
U.S. 494 (1971), and Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960), as
support for its conclusion that the concepts should be treated separately, and stated:
The Court has not melded the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel with the duty
to provide a reasonably safe place to work, but has repeatedly stated that the
two concepts of seaworthiness and negligence should remain separate and distinct.
486 F.2d at 1105.
33. 486 F.2d at 1107.
34. The case was remanded for a new trial. Although the court did not expressly
so state, it would appear that the charge to the jury at the new trial should omit any
reference to a duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work unless the plaintiffs
are granted leave to amend their complaint to allege a cause of action for negligence.
If no claim of negligence is made, however, there would be no need to attempt to
instruct the jury as to the relationship between that concept and unseaworthiness.
35. In Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 399 F.2d 347 (4th Cir.
1968), the case relied upon by the district court to support its charge, the Fourth
Circuit stated that "operational negligence has been subsumed under the doctrine of
unseaworthiness, and a trial court's instructions should no longer attempt to dis-
tinguish between the two." Id. at 351. Citing Mahnich and decisions of other cir-
cuits, the Venable court stated that a shipowner had an absolute duty to furnish a
safe place to work. Usner clearly undercut the Venable assertion that operational
,negligence had been merged with unseaworthiness, a fact recognized by the Earles
court. 486 F.2d at 1107. However, it could be argued that Usner does not mandate a
rejection of the Venable assertion that the duty to furnish a safe place to work is
absolute. The Usner holding was carefully limited to situations in which a third
party had committed a single, wholly unforeseen negligent act. 400 U.S. at 500.
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